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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL A. DEBORD,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 44743
Nez Perce County Case No.
CR-2015-2702

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Debord failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
revoking his probation and executing his unified sentence of five years, with two years
fixed, imposed following his guilty plea to grand theft?

Debord Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
On April 22, 2015, Debord went to Paula Coumbe’s residence “to help her
move.” (PSI, p.26. 1) When Paula stepped outside to assist a neighbor child, Debord
1

PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “SC#
44743 State v. DeBord-Confidential Exhibit.pdf.”
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remained inside her home and, a short time later, he exited “with a large white garbage
bag and told her he was going to the store to buy cigarettes.” (PSI, p.28.) Paula “went
back in the house and immediately noticed some items were missing,” including two
Kindle tablets, an iPod Touch, a smaller iPod, and numerous rings. (PSI, pp.26, 28.) In
addition, Paula noted that her Nikon Coolpix S220 camera and her pink ViperTek stun
device “fell out of a bag she saw Debord carry away from her residence.” (PSI, p.26.)
When officers responded, they located Debord in the neighborhood, hiding under
a camper with a large knife “immediately in front of him.”

(PSI, pp.26-27.)

Upon

searching Debord’s person for weapons, officers found seven knives, a knife sharpener,
and brass knuckles that “appeared to have a blade function as well.” (PSI, pp.22, 27.)
Officers also found the “large white garbage bag” nearby, which contained numerous
items including another “large knife in a green sheath,” two Kindle tablets, an iPod, and
the brown coat that Paula had seen Debord wearing earlier in the day. (PSI, p.27.)
Inside the coat pockets and liner, officers discovered three debit cards and a Visa card
“in the name of Paula Coumbe,” a Visa debit gift card, an H&R Block MasterCard,
seven rings, a pink flashlight, several reward/points cards, an envelope opener, three
“pieces of jewelry,” and a pill container with “1 COR 132, a Schedule 2 prescription
drug, 4 3TV150 acetaminophen and codein[e] phosphate 300mg, 6 E78 (Zolpidem
5mg), as well as 1 4H2 (Cetirizine 10mg).” (PSI, p.27 (parenthetical notations original).)
The state charged Debord with carrying a concealed weapon without a permit,
petit theft, and three counts of grand theft. (R., pp.15, 43, 97-98.) Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Debord pled guilty to one count of grand theft and the state dismissed the
remaining charges. (R., pp.103-04, 142-45.) While this case was pending, Debord
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failed to appear for a preliminary conference on July 6, 2015; for his substance abuse
evaluation on September 8, 2015 and also for his presentence interview; and for his
sentencing hearing on May 3, 2016.

(R., pp.77, 107, 109, 116, 129-30.) In each

instance, a bench warrant was issued and Debord was eventually arrested. (R., pp.87,
110, 131.) At the sentencing hearing held on June 23, 2016, the district court imposed
a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, suspended the sentence, and
placed Debord on supervised probation for three years. (R., pp.153-59.) The court
specifically warned Debord that any future probation violation would result in the
execution of his prison sentence. (R., p.146.)
Less than four months later, Debord’s probation officer filed a report of violation
alleging that Debord had violated the conditions of his probation by absconding
supervision.

(R., pp.160-61.) A bench warrant was issued and, after Debord was

located and arrested, the matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing, during which the
district court found that Debord violated his probation as alleged. (R., pp.165, 168-69.)
The district court revoked Debord’s probation and executed the underlying sentence.
(R., pp.171-74.) Debord filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court’s order
revoking probation. (R., pp.182-84.)
Debord asserts that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his
probation in light of his “commitment to his rehabilitation,” full-time job, and because,
while he “knew it was his responsibility to keep in contact” with his probation officer, he
“‘didn’t realize the gravity’ of his error in judgment at the time.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-6
(quoting Tr., p.33, Ls.18-20).) Debord has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
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“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.” I.C. § 19-2601(4).
The decision whether to revoke a defendant's probation for a violation is within the
discretion of the district court. State v. Garner, 161 Idaho 708, ___, 390 P.3d 434, 436
(2017) (quoting State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App.
2003)). In determining whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the
probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of
society. State v. Cornelison, 154 Idaho 793, 797, 302 P.3d 1066, 1070 (Ct. App. 2013)
(citations omitted). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon
a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Id. at 798, 302 P.3d at 1071 (citing
State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 326, 834 P.2d 326, 328 (Ct. App. 1992)).
Debord is not a suitable candidate for probation, particularly in light of his
ongoing failures to appear, failures to comply with court orders, and disregard for the
law and the terms of community supervision. His criminal history includes convictions
for several alcohol age violations, negligent driving, hit and run unattended vehicle,
invalid driver’s license, DWS, malicious mischief, theft, assault, burglary, possession of
stolen property, and delivery of methamphetamine.

(PSI, pp.5-7.)

At the time of

sentencing, he had outstanding warrants for charges of unlawful entry and DWP. (PSI,
pp.7-8.)

Debord also has a 20-year history of violating the law by using

methamphetamine, and he admitted that he was “using daily” before his arrest for the
instant offense in April 2015. (PSI, pp.1, 4, 13-14.)
Debord’s disregard for the law and his legal obligations continued while this case
was pending. He failed to appear for court hearing on July 6, 2015, and committed (and
was later convicted of) the new crime of willful concealment on July 14, 2015. (R., p.77;
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PSI, p.8.) He subsequently failed to appear for both his presentence interview and his
substance abuse evaluation in September 2015, and neither the presentence
investigator nor the substance abuse evaluator succeeded in their attempts to contact
him. (PSI, p.18; R., pp.107, 109, 116.) Ultimately, Debord was arrested and held in the
county jail until the interviews could be conducted. (PSI, p.18.) Staff at the Tyler Shaw
House, where Debord was residing in late 2015, reported that Debord had returned to
“‘active’” substance abuse by November 2015. (PSI, p.10.) In December 2015, Debord
failed to appear for court hearings in his unlawful entry and DWP cases, resulting in the
outstanding warrants for those charges. (PSI, pp.8-9.) Finally, Debord failed to appear
for his sentencing hearing in this case. (R., p.129.) At no time throughout the pendency
of this case did Debord hold himself accountable and turn himself in after failing to
appear. (R., pp.87, 110, 131; PSI, pp.8-9, 18.)
Debord was finally sentenced for the instant offense on June 23, 2016, at which
time the court specifically warned him that any probation violation in this case would
result in his imprisonment. (R., p.146.) As a condition of his probation, Debord was
required to complete the 30-day inpatient treatment program that he had started “and
provide the Court with documentation within the next month.” (R., pp.141, 157; Tr.,
p.24, Ls.24-25.) However, Debord did not return to the treatment facility until more than
a month later and consequently did not complete the program until August 26, 2016.
(Tr., p.24, Ls.1-9.) He next met with his probation officer “around the 15th of September”
(Tr., p.19, L.20), at which time his probation officer “made it specifically clear to [Debord]
that he needed to maintain contact with me because he didn’t have a phone and there
was no way I could reach him. I needed to know exactly where he would be staying
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and what he was up to. … He left my office after that meeting, and then I never heard
from him since” (Tr., p.11, Ls.6-12). Debord’s probation officer also told him that he was
required to remain in Idaho until an interstate compact was approved. (R., p.160.)
Later the same day, the probation officer left a message with Debord’s wife – which
Debord received – instructing Debord to return the call. (Tr., p.26, Ls.11-16.) Although
Debord claims he returned his probation officer’s call that day and “left messages” (Tr.,
p.30, Ls.5-22), and that he tried to call again a few days later, Debord’s probation officer
testified that no message was ever received (Tr., p.14, Ls.14-20; p.31, Ls.19-24). After
making multiple unsuccessful attempts to contact Debord via phone and by going to his
reported place of residence several times, Debord’s probation officer filed the report of
violation, on October 7, 2016, advising that Debord had absconded supervision. (R.,
pp.160-61; Tr., p.14, L.2.) The district court subsequently issued a bench warrant and,
when Debord learned of the warrant, he left the state and went to Washington. (R.,
p.164; Tr., p.35, Ls.15-21.)

He was not located and arrested on the warrant until

November 14, 2016. (R., p.13.)
At the disposition hearing, the state aptly noted that Debord “really did not
engage in probation whatsoever.” (Tr., p.38, Ls.2-3.) Indeed, following his release from
inpatient treatment, Debord met with his probation officer only once – three weeks after
his release – and then promptly absconded. (Tr., p.11, Ls.11-12; p.19, L.20; p.24, Ls.89.) He made no effort to report to the probation office in person, and he testified that
“the last time [he] tried calling” his probation officer was “roughly five days after” he was
instructed to call, which would have been on or about September 20, 2016. (Tr., p.34,
Ls.16-17; p.35, Ls.2-4.) Debord claimed that, after that call was unsuccessful, he “just
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assumed that [his probation officer] would get a hold of [him],” despite the fact that his
probation officer had been unable to contact him by phone, he was not staying at his
reported address, he left the State of Idaho, and he failed to make contact with his
probation officer for a full two months. (R., p.160; Tr., p.10, Ls.4-13; p.34, Ls.17-19;
p.35, Ls.15-21.)
An offender’s decision to abscond, no matter the reason, prevents authorities
from ensuring that probation is serving its intended function. In no way can probation
meet the goals of protecting the community and rehabilitation if the probationer chooses
to remove himself from probation supervision. See State v. Sandoval, 92 Idaho 853,
860, 452 P.2d 350, 357 (1969) (citing State v. Oyler, 92 Idaho 43, 436 P.2d 706 (1968))
(emphasis added) (purpose of probation is to give the offender “an opportunity to be
rehabilitated under proper control and supervision”). Debord was fully aware that failing
to stay in contact with his probation officer and absconding supervision was in violation
of the conditions of his probation, and he was not deterred by the knowledge that his
entire sentence could be imposed. His decision to disregard his legal obligations in this
case is a continuation of his pattern of criminal conduct and demonstrates his failure to
rehabilitate and his continued risk to the community. Debord is not an appropriate
candidate for community supervision in light of his unwillingness to abide by the terms
of release by making himself unavailable for supervision and his repeated decisions to
fail to appear for his mandatory appointments and court dates.
At the disposition hearing, the district court articulated its reasons for revoking
Debord’s probation. (Tr., p.38, L.6 – p.39, L.18.) The state submits that Debord has
failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached
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excerpt of the disposition hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on
appeal. (Appendix A.)

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order
revoking Debord’s probation and executing his underlying sentence.

DATED this 8th day of August, 2017.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 8th day of August, 2017, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
REED P. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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The defendant failed to, even at this time,

1

2

really accept full responsibility of what he 's done .

3

really did not engage in probation whatsoever.

4

that,

Based on

the State would argue for that.

5

THE COURT:

Thank you .

6

Mr.

you have quite a his tory

DeBord,

7

generally and also j ust in th is case specifically .

8

The re is a lengthy criminal record,

9

account prior to today.

which was taken into

Th ere's been a -- I

r ealize a

10

l ong time ago, but there was a prior rider ,

11

jurisdiction, which you failed on, and the Cour t

12

relinquished jurisdiction in that case .

13

In this case,

r eta i ned

there's been several f a i lure

14

to appears dating back to the preliminary hearing in

15

this matter.

16

August of 2015.

17

sentencing after that .

18

cas e .

Sentencing was delayed time and t ime and time

19

again,

loo king for inpat ient treatment,

20

He

The change of plea was clear ba ck in
There was a fa ilure to appear at a
It required an arrest on that

apparently .

Eventually, sentencing was completed after
On June 23rd, at th at time,

21

two additional arrests .

22

there was a recommenda tion for at leas t

23

jurisdiction .

24

inpatient treatment,

25

clearly ind icate that I told you at that time,

a retained

Based on your efforts to seek your own
I did not do tha t .
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My notes
thoug h ,
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If I

found a probation

1

it was your last chance .

2

violation ,

3

jurisdic tion and impose sentence in this matter .

I was going to simply bypass the retained

It

4

would appear,

given your history ,

you

5

would know the severity of the conseq uences for not

6

maintaining contact with your probation of f icer.

7

was the warrant,

8

was no attempt to talk to your probation officer or turn

9

yourself in on that warrant.

which you admit you knew of,

There

and there

You remained out of touch,

10

basically absconding until the -- you were arrested on

11

that .
Based on that ,

12

based on my former promise to

13

you ,

14

probation.

15

matter of not less than two years ,

16

yea rs.

17

reimpose the court costs and public defe nder fees in

18

t his matter.

I

am,

based on finding you in v i o l ation ,

revoking

I'm imposing the original sentence i n this
nor more than five

I will give you credit for time served and

19

Anything further ,

20

MR. CUDDIHY :

21

THE COURT :

22

MR . COLEMAN:

23

THE COURT :

24

(COU RT IN RECESS . )

No .

Mr . Cuddihy?
Thank you,

Your Honor .

Mr . Coleman?
No.

Thank you.

We'll be in recess .

25
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Thank you .

